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Abstract 
   
Networks in transportation have existed in Canada for some time and their importance has 
been highlighted since globalization. Some observers believe that they define the key to 
success in today’s dynamic marketplace. This is hardly surprising in a world where being 
able to provide service is of paramount importance since the dismantling of regulatory, legal 
and international barriers. This paper considers ‘Canadian transportation networks: gaps 
and opportunities’. It reviews the meaning of a network and the various networks in different 
transportation modes. The gaps and opportunities in Canadian transportation networks are 
examined thereafter. Then the economic rationale for networks and their impact is briefly 
considered. Finally, the treatment of networks under the Competition Act and in two other 
major jurisdictions are briefly examined. 
 
 
Date of receipt of final manuscript: February 2009 
Canadian Journal of Transportation                                                                                                    Volume 2, Part 1 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Networks have always been important in transportation. This is particularly true today in the 
context of globalization. Some observers believe that they facilitate success in today’s 
dynamic marketplace. This is hardly surprising in a world where being able to provide service 
is of paramount importance. 
 In light of this, this paper will consider the theme ‘Canadian transportation networks: 
gaps and opportunities’. Part 2 reviews the meaning of a network and the various networks in 
different transportation modes. Part 3 examines the gaps and opportunities in Canadian 
transportation networks. In Part 4, the economic rationale for networks and their impact is 
briefly considered. Parts 5 and 6 examine the treatment of networks under the competition 
laws in Canada and in two other major jurisdictions. 
 
2.0 Transportation Networks in Canada 
 
There is no unique definition of the term network. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it 
as an “arrangement with intersecting lines & interstices...”  In mathematical topology, it is 
defined as “...a figure (in a plane or in space) consisting of a finite, non-zero, number of arcs, 
no two of which intersect except possibly at their end points.”(Arnold, 1963, p. 31) Topology 
has a long history dating back to 1700 to solve the Konigsberg bridge problem. Some scholars 
note that this matter dates back even further to the Roman era when the issue of constructing 
one way roads arose to deal with congestion. In economics, the term network gained a toehold 
with the consideration of its ‘effects’. The use of the term network effects can be traced to 
Harvey Leibenstein’s use of the word ‘bandwagon effect’ in 1950 by which he meant ‘the 
extent to which the demand for a commodity is increased due to the fact that others are also 
consuming the same commodity.’ (See Besen, 1999.)  Further use of the term in this context 
lay largely dormant until the 1980s, except for its application to communications. 
 Later, it began to be explored in greater depth in the context of the economics of 
standardization. To most modern companies networks are a strategic tool to gain competitive 
advantage. In transportation, networks in Canada first developed in rail but became prominent 
in connection with the development of ‘hub and spokes’ in airlines. They also occur in 
telecommunications and computers, broadcasting, cable television, finance and electricity. 
Today, networks are widespread and are part of the global economy, engines of fast growth. 
(Economides, 2004) 
 
2.1 Rail 
The development of networks in rail can be traced to rail mergers. By the early 1900s, three 
transcontinental lines had been built but insufficient traffic led to massive railroad 
bankruptcies and to consolidation and the formation of the Canadian National Railways (CN) 
in 1919. By 1999, the network movement gathered new steam when CN merged with Illinois 
Central (IC), becoming the only railroad in North America to reach three coasts: Pacific, 
Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico. By 2005, the railway network consisted of 48,467 km of 
track. 
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2.2 Air 
The network of airline services was initially conditioned by Government policy and bilateral 
agreements. Transcontinental and international routes were preserved for Trans Continental 
Airlines (now Air Canada i.e., AC). It was not until 1948, that Canadian Pacific Air Lines 
(CPAL) was given the right to operate in the Pacific which was later extended to certain parts 
of the world and across Canada. The era of deregulation, in the mid ’80s, ushered in the 
concept of 'hub and spoke' leading to a structure of 'networks' and 'alliances'. By the late 
1990s, AC and Canadian (i.e., PWA and CPAL) had networks throughout Canada. There is 
also the network of 726 airports. 
 
2.3 Road 
As late as 1931, there was no road network linking all the provinces. Grants made by the 
Dominion in 1948 led to the completion of the Trans-Canada Highway in 1962. By 2002, the 
road network exceeded 1.4m two lane km: 110,000km -freeway and primary highways; 
115,000km - secondary highways and other arterial roads; and more than 1.2m km of local 
and rural roads. The provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British 
Columbia accounted for 80% of the road network.  The road infrastructure to the United 
States consists of bridges and border crossings. In addition, the Confederation Bridge, the 
longest over ice, links the provinces of PEI and NB. 
 
2.4 Water 
In ocean shipping, Canada does not play a major role and consequently does not have what 
one would refer to as a network of shipping lines. The five world alliances have a significant 
share of the traffic on the Trans-Pacific, Asia-Europe, Transatlantic and Latin America trade 
lanes. To serve these lines there is, however, a network of ports which consists of 20 Canada 
Port Authorities, together with regional and local ports operated by Transport Canada. 
 
2.5 Pipelines 
Networks in the pipeline industries are of more recent origin.  In the natural gas and crude oil 
industry, the first three pipelines in each were constructed in the 1940s and 1950s and have 
since increased to ten and twelve, respectively. These networks serve specific geographic 
markets: intra-provincial; interprovincial; and cross-border.  
 In sum, there is no unique definition of the word networks, nevertheless transportation 
networks are widespread in Canada having existed for sometime and are more developed in 
certain modes than others. They are akin to arteries which enable life giving blood cells to be 
carried to various parts of the human body. 
 
3.0. Gaps and Opportunities 
 
3.1 Background and Gaps 
Canada is in the midst of a social and economic transformation. This transformation is being 
accelerated by deregulation, liberalization and globalization. This has resulted in: the growth 
and movement of people in and into cities, particularly four highly urbanized areas; a 
restructuring of the economy, with new products, jobs, markets and geographies of 
production; a more dynamic, vibrant and competitive economy with new patterns of 
movement; and increased trade.(Parsons 2003, p.10) These developments are having a major 
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impact on the overall transportation network; transportation corridors; urban networks and 
transit; and transportation related assets creating special challenges and gaps in the 
transportation network.  
 
3.1.1 Overall Transportation Network 
Canada has become one of the most urbanized countries in the world with one-third of its 
population living in its three largest cities and two-thirds in its twenty-five. Besides 
urbanization, population has increased from 26.1m in 1986 to 32.3m in 2005. As a result, 
more cars are being driven, more goods are being transported and all this over longer 
distances. Not surprisingly, the urban road network is unable to keep up with this growing 
demand. Apart from the movement of passengers on roads, there has also been a dramatic 
increase in the number of people flying by air which has increased from 31m. in 1993 to 
63.6m. in 2005. This has placed an increased need for capacity and infrastructure at the 
airports and in particular airports classified as the National Airport System (NAS). 
 Besides the impact on road and airport networks, there has also been an impact on the 
network of ports and rails as Canada has always been a trading nation. Its exports and imports 
increased from 51.2% of the GDP in 1989 to 70-80% in 2005. This percentage while helpful 
in understanding the direction of the increase does not provide a sense of the true magnitude 
or volume of this movement. For example, truck traffic nearly doubled, rising from 7.1m 
border crossings in 1991 to 13.33m in 2005, i.e. 46.7%. In ocean transportation, containerized 
international cargo increased from approximately 9m tonnes in 1985 to 28m in 2003. In rail, 
the volume of traffic carried increased from 265m tonnes in 1990 to 354m in 2004. 
 These increases have put an increasing strain on Canadian networks. If this is so today, in 
10, 25 or 50 years when Canada’s population is expected to increase by 2.9, 7.7 or 10.2 
million, the impact would be staggering.  
 
3.1.2 Transportation corridors 
An increase in trade and a shift in traffic has had an effect on cross-border and port gateway 
corridors. Trade has increased from about $217b in 1987 to $813b in 2005. Of its trading 
partners, US has been Canada’s most important increasing from $155b in 1987 to $580b in 
2005 (71% of the total trade in 2005, with exports representing 84% and imports 57%). Apart 
from the US, Asian countries are of particular interest. Trade with them has recently surged 
from about $62b in 1987 to $233b in 2005. Of particular interest is the rapid growth of trade 
with China rising from about $3b in 1990 to $36.5b in 2005. It is now second to the US 
surpassing Japan and Mexico. 
  Trade with the US mostly moves by truck. What is particularly noticeable is the 
concentration of its movement on few cross border sites. Of the 20 crossings accounting for 
90 percent of total truck movement in 2005, the four busiest (Windsor, Fort Erie, Sarnia, and 
Niagara Falls) were in Ontario handling about 3.7m. trucks in 1991 compared to 7.45m. trucks 
in 2005 or 55.8 per cent of the total number of crossings. Apart from the increase in trade, 
there has been a shift in traffic caused by trade agreements (NAFTA and CUSTA) which 
means more north-south traffic. On a tonne-km basis, north-south for-hire trucking across the 
US border increased from 30% to 41% of the total between 1990 and 1996.The increase in 
trade from Asian countries has also brought a relative increase in traffic at West Coast ports 
compared to East Coast ports. Almost 75 percent (by value) of Canada’s exports to Asian 
countries are shipped through BC. “Vancouver has, in fact, been the fastest growing container 
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port in North America registering an average annual growth rate of 13.5% from 1995 to 
2005.”(WESTAC, 2006) 
 This increase in trade and shift of traffic has not only resulted in lack of capacity or 
infrastructure along certain cross border corridors but also at BC ports and related 
infrastructure. As stated by one authority “China’s increased trade with Canada and the U.S. 
has been a new driving force in North American business, putting more strain on 
transportation infrastructure and modal logistics.” (Transport Canada, 2006a, p. 7) 
 
3.1.3 Urban network and transit 
The nucleus of Canadian activity is now in Canadian cities with the shift in rural population to 
urban areas. In 1900, 66% of the Canadian population lived in rural areas compared to 23% in 
1991 and 20.3% in 2001. This shift was been accentuated by the fact that 80% of immigrants 
begin their life in Canada by taking residence in urban areas. The 2001 Census identified four 
areas of rapid increase in concentration of people: the Golden Horseshoe region in Ontario; 
Montreal and surrounding area; the Calgary-Edmonton corridor and the Lower Mainland 
Vancouver region. 
  In these urban areas, roads and automobiles are the primary means of transportation and 
motor carriers (vans and truck) are the principal method of freight delivery. In contrast, 
public transit accounts for only about 5% of urban passenger travel measured in passenger 
kilometres. While this reflects preference for the former, “... it also reflects the fact that 
transit is by no means available to all Canadians -- less than 60% live in communities served 
by transit -- and that only a much smaller proportion of all trips could be taken by transit 
instead of private car.” (Vision and Balance, 2001, p. 217)  
  This suggests that the supporting transportation infrastructure and the development of 
transit has had difficulty keeping pace. The Minister of Transport in his Transportation 
Blueprint indicated “Our urban road network cannot keep up to this growing demand, and our 
public transit systems are struggling to provide an alternative to move people.”(Ontario 
Ministry of Transportation, 2001 p. 9) “The Panel (Canadian Transportation Act Review 
Panel) sees urban areas as a source of major transportation problems and urban transit as a key 
component of a comprehensive multi-modal transport policy.” (Vision and Balance, 2001, p. 
215)   
 
3.1.4 Transportation Related Assets 
Other gaps include related physical assets, nonphysical assets and institutional practices or 
policies. There are related infrastructure capacity constraints. The Western Transportation 
Advisory Council (WESTAC) indicates that in the West: additional west coast terminal 
capacity for coal will be required; new container capacity beyond the TSI Terminal Systems 
Inc.'s new berth at Deltaport and Prince Rupert's phase 1 terminal will be required; and 
additional train slots for both commodities and containers will be needed. 
 The forecasted traffic growth and large transportation projects underway will make the 
shortage of skilled workers even worse. As indicated in the Gateway and Corridor Initiative 
"There are significant pressures in the Gateway, including shortages of workers, rising skill 
requirements, integration of immigrants and competing pressures for skilled labour from other 
sectors and regions". (Transport Canada, 2006b,  p. 16) 
 Besides physical and non-physical assets, experts indicate that there are several 
institutional gaps: financing, regulatory and ownership. Most of the transportation system is 
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privately financed. Huge amounts of capital and innovative financing are needed together with 
regulatory changes. A study by Parsons states "The current financial environment is not 
supportive of a stable long term planning framework for transport infrastructure investments.  
New approaches are required."(Parsons, 2003, p. 18) Further, "investments will not be made 
unless there is the right fiscal and regulatory environment." Regulatory impediments also exist 
on access to global markets and foreign capital i.e. attracting foreign capital. 
  In sum, when societies and economies change, the infrastructure and institutions that 
support them must also change - including the transportation infrastructure. The failure to do 
so has created gaps. The old transportation network was not built for the new ‘city-centred’ 
reality of Canada. (Parsons, 2003, p. 21) Nor was it built for the present volume of trade. 
Speeches from the throne have recognized that modern infrastructure is a key to the prosperity 
of our cities and health of our communities. Not surprisingly, this has created new 
opportunities. 
 
3.2 Opportunities 
  
3.2.1 Overall Transportation network 
Addressing overall increases in demand for transportation network have to be addressed from 
a practical standpoint. Before jumping to the conclusion that investment in network 
infrastructure should be made various alternatives have to be considered. Can one meet the 
increased demand by improving efficiencies of the existing network through new techniques 
and technologies? Can one meet the increased demand by using substitutable networks? Can 
one meet the increased demand by using the pricing mechanism to affect the use of different 
modes? 
 A recent study by Parsons provides a broad answer to the first two questions.  
 
Canada's transportation capacity issues are real. All modes of transportation are 
under stress. For many years the transportation industries of Canada addressed their 
capacity issues through increasing efficiency by investing in new technologies, better 
information management, just-in-time deliveries, improved management practices 
and fuel efficiencies. These measures allowed the industry to steadily increase 
productivity through most of the 1990s with productivity rising for the sector by 
2.8% per year and output rising by 6.8%. However, by the year 2000 productivity 
growth was showing declines and the growth in output had fallen by 28%. (Parsons, 
2003, p. 13) 
 
Moreover, "Across Canada the infrastructure investment shortfall is much larger and has for 
many years been well documented." (Transport Canada, 2006b, p. 13)  In 1998, the Council of 
Transportation Ministers estimated that $17 billion would be required to bring the national 
highway system to acceptable standards. An answer to the third question such as user pay, 
payment for social cost, etc. while likely to correct some distortion in demand is also unlikely 
to alter the need for large investment. This has led to concentration on the need for investment 
as a solution.   
 
3.2.2 Transportation corridors 
A limited number of border crossings and integrated gateways can be considered as potential 
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opportunities for investment based on present trade flows: 
 
Cross-border Corridors: Several sources have identified a second crossing at Windsor – the 
world's single most important gateway for land trade – as an immediate need. A few crossings 
have also been singled out as opportunities and projects have already been initiated such as: a 
new river crossing at the Detroit-Windsor Gateway; a fifth lane at the Niagara Falls 
Queenston-Lewiston Bridge; an expansion at the Fort Erie -Peace Bridge; and a new 
extension of the Highway 15 NEXUS/FAST truck lane in Surrey, B.C. at the Pacific Highway 
Border Crossing. Other important border-crossings that could be potential opportunities for 
investment are: Sarnia-Blue Water Bridge, Lansdowne-Thousand Island, Niagara Rainbow 
Bridge and Cornwall crossing all in Ontario; and the Lacolle crossing in Quebec. 
 
Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridors: To capitalize on the dramatic increase in trade between 
Canada and Asia, a number of reports have suggested the need for investment in the Pacific 
gateway. This opportunity was recently seized upon by the Federal government when it 
announced Canada’s Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor initiative. It committed $591m to the 
Gateway project. A total of $283m was committed immediately to the following infrastructure 
projects: the Pitt River Bridge and Mary Hill Interchange, Roberts Bank Railway Corridor 
Overpasses and Underpasses, Twinning of the Trans Canada Highway in Banff National Park, 
and South Fraser Perimeter Road.  In Prince Rupert too, a $60m plan was launched for a new 
container terminal. To optimize the potential and opportunities of Canada’s Asia-Pacific 
gateway project other investments are needed in rail and road. In rail, British Columbia’s 
immediate concerns include the inability of railways to handle projected growth over the next 
five years for example on the Calgary-Vancouver Corridor.  
 
Atlantic Gateway: The recent $5.7b decision by Panama to widen the Panama Canal may 
create opportunities. The Premier of Nova Scotia is seeking federal backing of $400m for an 
Atlantic Gateway which includes improvement to the Port of Halifax and highway upgrades to 
NB. Some researchers also suggest developing East Coast-US-Mexico shipping.  
 
3.2.3 Urban network and transit 
Suggestions for improving urban networks and transit range from creating demand for 
substitutable and new networks to improving the efficiency of the present system. 
 
 Substitutable Networks: Opportunities exist for increasing the demand for mass passenger 
transit. This would not only lead to less congestion on the highways but also less pollution. 
Examples of the former are through support of GO Transit and through increase of inter-city 
bus systems which usually have underutilised capacity. Suggestions to reduce truck traffic 
range from using alternative transportation modes to altering relative prices for different 
modes. Others have suggested changing shipper loading/unloading times as this would be a 
more effective approach through greater shipper/receiver coordination, government 
encouragement and truck only lanes on major highways. 
   
New Networks: Opportunities could exist for new forms of transit. Examples of the latter are 
investing in new transit lines and encouraging the use of car-pooling (which could also be 
considered part of the next section “Improving Efficiency”) and by using disincentive 
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schemes such as increasing parking fees, special taxes, etc. Light rail projects, similar to the 
one being considered in Ottawa, may provide opportunities for cities in Canada of similar size 
or in high density cities along new routes.  
 
Improving Efficiency: Opportunities exist for new techniques and technologies to improve the 
efficiency of the network or free flow of traffic. Studies have cited two major obstacles to free 
flow: collision and road construction. Proposals to deal with the former are giving a higher 
priority to clearing collisions on roads by reducing overlapping jurisdictional control by 
various levels of government and by streamlining police investigations to speed up the 
process. Proposals to deal with the latter are shortening the time that projects block the 
highway and improving construction techniques. New technologies can also improve 
efficiency and reduce congestion such as: utilizing new paving technologies and use of 
alternative materials; overhead signs on road status; other uses of ITS to clear trucks through 
weight inspection stations and border points through transmittal of custom documents, etc.  
 
3.2.4 Transportation related assets 
 
Other Non-Physical Assets: Opportunities exist for suppliers of terminal and related 
equipment. WESTAC suggest opportunities to meet the forecasted demand at: the new 
terminal at Deltaport, phase 2 of the Prince Rupert facility, Fraser River Docks and the Port's 
Richmond properties. 
           
 Other Non-Physical Assets: Opportunities exist for both skilled and non-skilled labour. The 
forecasted national demand for new truck drivers per year until 2008 is 37,000, according to 
the Canadian Trucking Human Resources Council. Research by the Construction Sector 
Council estimates a demand of 22-27,000 workers between 2005-8 for the Oil Sands and 2010 
Olympic Games. Further, forecasts indicate a demand for 86,000 supply-chain persons in 3-5 
years. 
   
Institutional: Opportunities for creating the right environment for investment include - 
changing the public perception that tax funds collected in transportation activities are not 
returned into the sector; creating neutrality and stability in taxation between modes and 
regions of Canada for a stable infrastructure investment program to develop, etc. 
Opportunities exist for changing the regulatory requirements-liberalizing bilateral agreements, 
especially those involving BC as only 40% of Canada's bilateral air service agreements allow 
foreign carrier's access to Vancouver's International Airport; - raising ownership limits of 
airlines so as to attract foreign capital, etc.   
 
In sum, gaps have created opportunities and time is of the essence if Canada is to capture the 
growth opportunities and optimize its investment in its existing infrastructure. Some have 
called for a National Transportation Strategy and others for a National Transportation 
Investment Strategy. 
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4.0 Economic Rationale and Impact of Transportation Networks 
 
4.1 The Theory of Network Externalities 
The theory of network externalities advances the notion that benefits or costs may arise on the 
supply-side or  the demand-side that are not taken into account in the pricing mechanism. On 
the supply-side, the joint provision of service by members may result in economies or 
diseconomies that are not captured or paid for by providers of the network. Similarly, on the 
demand-side, externalities may arise because they are not captured or paid for by users of the 
network. These externalities arise because of the subtle interdependencies in the welfare of 
different units - interdependencies which cannot readily be reflected in the pricing 
arrangement. (Baumol, 1965, p. 370) This is because it cannot be easily  measured or because 
mechanisms do not exist to collect them or to collect them efficiently. This has implications 
for the allocation of resources even in perfectly competitive markets. An interesting 
implication of this for competition advocates is that where there are external diseconomies, 
the presence of monopolies can lead to outputs smaller, and therefore more nearly optimal, 
than those which would result from competition. (Baumol, 1965, p. 371) Network effects have 
largely been developed in telecommunications (with regard to benefits) and transport (with 
regard to costs). These externalities provide the basis for the theory. 
  Examples of externalities can be found in transportation. On the supply-side, the 
establishment of a shipping line at a port may lead to expenditures to create a pool of related 
services which a new shipping line which does not have to pay for. Or the expansion of an 
industry or a shipping line may make it cheaper for other shipping lines to operate because of 
lower cost in the supply of inputs. On the demand-side, the increase in cars or trucks on a 
highway network can increase congestion and ultimately result in gridlock which increases the 
cost to all vehicles which is not taken into account in the consumption or production pricing of 
transport services. Or the increase can result in more noise or air pollution whose costs do not 
have to be borne by the users of the highway. Or the addition of segments or arteries to a rail 
or road network may provide benefits to the existing users of these networks by enabling them 
to send traffic or travel to destinations that were previously not available to the existing users 
or by making complementary products available (e.g. more fuel and restaurant facilities). 
  The special features of markets with network effects have been described by Economides 
(2004). Those applicable to transport are highlighted. First, a firm can make money from 
either side of the network. Second, an additional user of the network is not rewarded for the 
benefit it brings to others. Third, the pace of market penetration (market expansion) is much 
faster in network industries than in non-network industries. Fourth, markets with strong 
network effects where firms can chose their own technical standards (e.g. different rail 
gauges) are ‘winner-take-most’ markets resulting in extreme market share and profit 
inequality. Fifth, in industries with significant network externalities, under conditions of 
incompatibility between competing platforms, monopoly may maximize social surplus. Sixth, 
inequality is natural in the market structure of network industries. Seventh, free entry in 
network industries does not lead to perfect competition and eliminating barriers may not 
significantly affect market structure. Eighth, ‘winner takes most’ is the natural equilibrium in 
these markets. Ninth, competition for the market takes precedence over competition in the 
market at least initially. Tenth, is the importance of path dependence - today’s sales depend on 
past number sold.  
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4.2 The Impact of Transportation networks 
 
4.2.1 The Impact of Expansion of Networks 
First, the expansion of a network increases the potential of services and trade between various 
regions. It enables the development of resource industries which would not be possible 
without reasonable transportation facilities. In the event that an alternative transportation 
facility exists, it enhances the potential for competition and could lower price. Where an 
alternative does not exist, it provides services to captive shippers. 
 Second, it increases demand for the entire network and enhances the potential for the 
network to become more viable. The increase not only originates from the communities along 
the expanded network but also from other communities on other parts of the network who 
attempt to reach them. It also makes the previous network more financially viable as new 
communities would most likely transport goods and passengers on the previous network. 
  Third, expansion of the network increases the potential of intermodal and intramodal 
competition. For example, the extension of an existing subway in a city increases competition 
for bus, taxi or car users. Similarly, expansion of a second railway would increase intramodal 
competition. 
  Finally, there are numerous other effects such as uniting a nation e.g. when CPR was 
constructed, development of remote regions, improving standards of living in remote and 
underdeveloped regions, reducing congestion and population density in certain cities, etc.  
   
4.2.2 The impact related to hub-and-spoke networks 
The effects related to hub-and-spoke networks (air, sea, rail or trucking) are: enhancement of 
efficiency; enhancement of demand for the network; and reduction of competition or potential 
competition. 
 In the case of networks that do overlap the efficiency benefits from an agreement among 
carriers to enter into joint sharing capacity agreements or to form an alliance can be 
significant to the extent that there is greater scope for rationalization of the hub spoke system. 
The agreement or alliance can result in a significant reduction of competition on all 
overlapping routes. 
 In the case of networks that do not overlap but share a common hub, an agreement among 
carriers to enter into joint sharing capacity agreements or to form an alliance can yield 
efficiency gains from seamless operation and a reduction of any duplicate resources from 
sharing of the hub. There will also be an anti-competitive effect of increased market power at 
the hub. 
 In the case of networks that do not overlap except on the hub-hub route and where there 
are no potential entrants into each others market (as in the case of international air alliances) 
an agreement among carriers to enter into a joint sharing capacity agreements or to form an 
alliance can result in efficiency gains in the form of seamless operations. In addition, 
efficiency may arise on the hub-hub route from rationalization, increased density, etc. There 
will also be reduction of competition on the hub-hub route. 
 In sum, the theory of network externalities advances the notion that benefits or costs may 
arise that are not taken into account in the pricing mechanism. Markets with network effects 
have special features. Expansion of networks increases the potential of services and trade to 
various geographical areas; increases demand for the network and potential for the network to 
become viable; increases the potential of intermodal competition; and can have other effects.  
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Of the three hub and spoke cases, the first case could lead to the greatest competition 
concerns. In addition, if the network structure itself changes, there would be an effect on 
traffic patterns and on transport related services.   
 
5.0 Transportation Networks Under the Competition Act 
 
Networks are not specifically referred to in any provision of the Competition Act. 
Nevertheless, they could raise concern if they result in anti-competitive acts leading to the 
abuse of dominance, predatory behaviour or collusion. 
 
5.1 Abuse of Dominance 
Network effects result in a market structure dominated by a few firms where bigger is better. 
It creates barriers to entry which tend to insulate an existing network from competition 
thereby enhancing its market power. Since costs of building a network in transportation are 
generally sunk, it enhances the barrier to entry. This makes market penetration by a new 
entrant much slower than would occur in non-network industries. These entry barriers 
increase the likely duration and the value of market power or monopoly power. It thus 
increases the incentive and the likelihood that the dominant carrier will engage in anti-
competitive acts to maintain its dominance or for a new carrier to obtain its market power. The 
anti-competitive acts can range from: denying access, tying, entering exclusive agreements, 
refusing to supply, etc.   
 
5.2 Predatory Behaviour 
Predatory behaviour and predatory strategies are more likely in industries where the future 
payoff of such behaviour is greater. Since, in network industries, the winner takes the most, 
behaviour such as price discrimination or selling below costs to drive out a new entrant are 
more likely than in non-network industries. Further, the likelihood of success of such a 
strategy is higher for an established network firm given entry barriers faced by a new or 
potential entrant. 
 
5.3 Collusion  
Collusive behaviour is also facilitated in networks that are horizontal since there are typically 
fewer competitors than in non-network industries. In addition, it is easier to achieve and 
enforce collusive behaviour in such industries than in non-network industries. 
  
5.4 Mergers 
Vertical mergers in network industries have attracted a great deal of attention, especially 
among railways. Concerns about leveraging of market power from one network to another 
have been raised, but Chicago economists have claimed that the leveraging theory does not 
apply to a bottleneck monopolist. Econometric tests and other economists do not support their 
view. (Grimm et al. 1992, pp.  295-311. See also Tye and Horn, 2000, p. 16, Scherer and 
Ross, 1990; Riordan and Salop, 1995; and Riordan, 1998.) Further, the effect of integration on 
connected vertical networks is neglected. 
 The above has important implications for antitrust enforcement as it increases the 
incentives for network industries to obtain or maintain market power or to engage in anti-
competitive behaviour leading to such power. It also alerts antitrust enforcers and courts to 
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certain types of antitrust strategies and point to certain characteristics of the market. 
 
5.5 Antitrust Strategies and Characteristics 
The types of antitrust strategies of network industries that have attracted attention are: denying 
access to new entrants and rivals; merging with vertical networks to exclude competitors; 
foreclosing entry by tying or through exclusionary agreement or through control of access to 
standards. 
 Certain characteristics are found in these network industries, however, they may not be 
because of anti-competitive behaviour. First, these markets display somewhat large market 
share inequalities together with profit inequality. Therefore, there should be no presumption 
that anti-competitive actions are responsible for the creation of market share inequality or very 
high profitability of the top firm. Second, free entry in network industries does not lead to 
perfect competition and eliminating barriers to entry may not significantly affect the market 
structure. Third, monopoly may maximize social surplus and breakup of monopoly into two 
competing firms could reduce rather than increase it. 
 
5.6 Jurisprudence 
Courts in Canada have dealt with denial of access to essential facilities under preemption of 
scarce facilities or resources in section 79. It is closely related to the essential facilities 
doctrine in US jurisprudence. This doctrine applies to situations where access to an asset is 
required for effective competition and this asset cannot be economically reproduced.  
According to this doctrine, under some circumstances, a firm may be required to provide 
access to such an asset to its competitors. 
 A few noteworthy cases that dealt with this issue are: A.C. Nielsen (a sole supplier in 
Canada of sales reports), Gemini (control of the computer reservation systems by the merger 
of the two dominant air carriers), and Interac (control of the supply of shared electronic 
network services for consumer-initiated shared electronic financial services). In these cases, 
access issues were generally resolved through measures which change the incentives facing 
the parties or by ensuring adequate access without price regulation. (Anderson, et al. 1998 p. 
199)  
 In sum, networks are not specially referred to in any provision of the Competition Act 
though anti-competitive practices that may arise in such industries raise greater concern in 
light of the structural characteristics of these industries. A great deal of care, however, should 
be exercised in drawing any conclusions from their market structure. Attempts to increase 
competition have emphasized access within the existing structure rather than creating 
competition with new competitive networks. Economides concludes his research on 
competition policy in network industries by noting that ...”the legal system does not yet have a 
framework for analysis of competition policy issues in network industries.  ...  economic 
theory of networks is so inadequate and unsettled that there is no commonly accepted body of 
knowledge on market structure with network externalities, based on which one could evaluate 
deviations toward anti-competitive behavior.” (Economides, 2004) 
 
6.0. Treatment of Networks by U.S. and EEC Antitrust Authorities 
 
6.1 United States 
In the US, network industries are not subject to special antitrust rules. However, anti-
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competitive conduct involving networks which result in monopolization, attempted 
monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize are dealt with under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.  In addition, anti-competitive conduct can also be dealt with under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act where it involves concerted action by two or more networks. 
 A common type of monopolization case is a claim where a network monopoly has 
unlawfully refused to deal with another company. This refusal led to the essential facilities 
doctrine (when it involved denial of access to a particular facility). The doctrine, as developed 
by lower courts, is established when the following elements are established: the control of an 
essential facility by a monopolist; a competitor’s inability reasonably or practically to 
duplicate the essential facility; the denial of the use of the facility to the competitor; and the 
provision to the competitor of access to the facility if feasible. The term facility has generally 
been applied to tangible assets such as physical structures. (Economides, 2004)  The facility, 
however, will not be deemed essential if equivalent facilities exist or if the benefits from 
access can be obtained in another fashion. 
  The origins of this doctrine can be attributed to a transportation case, United States v. 
Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis (U.S. Supreme Court, 1959), involving a railroad 
network. The railroad originally owned one bridge, then acquired the other and the ferry 
system that could transfer railroad cars. The government challenged the acquisition under 
Section 1. The Supreme Court recognized that access to the unified system of bridges and 
terminals was essential for rail access and ordered access to all users on reasonable terms. 
  In the view of the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice, “... network industries should not be subject to special antitrust 
rules. Network industries do not give rise to competition problems that are so unique that they 
require different or heightened forms of antitrust intervention; nor are the benefits of network 
industries so enormous or so fragile, or the difficulties of applying antitrust principles to 
network industries so great, as to warrant special leniency or forbearance from antitrust 
enforcement. Traditional antitrust principles of general application should be applied to 
network industries, as to other industries.”(Melamed, 1999) 
 
6.2 EEC 
In the EEC, Articles 81 and 82 (formerly 85 and 86) of the Treaty are fully applicable to the 
transport sector. Article 82 concerned with abuse of dominance contains two essential 
elements: the existence of a dominant position; and the abuse of such a position. Article 82 
also contains a list of non-exhaustive abusive practices which has been construed by the Court 
of Justice and the Commission to reach: (i) every act or practice whereby a dominant 
undertaking exploits its market power to the prejudice of its purchasers or suppliers (direct 
exploitation); and (ii) every act or practice causing an undue lessening of competition 
(monopolization). A refusal to grant access to an essential facility is also prohibited under this 
article when it has anti-competitive effects or in some cases also exploitative ones and which 
is not objectively justified. 
 The Commission defines an essential facility as a ‘facility or infrastructure which is 
essential for reaching customers and/or enabling competitors to carry on their business, and 
which cannot be replaced by any reasonable means.’ The concept of essential facility was first 
used by the Commission in transport cases concerned with harbour infrastructure and 
computer reservation systems (i.e., Sea Containers v Stena Sealink (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1993) and London European-Sabena (Commission of the European 
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Communities,1988)). Since then, the matter of essential facility has risen in connection with 
other industries such as banking, energy and telecommunications. This is particularly 
instructive as it arose in connection with networks, which suggests that the Commission could 
adopt a similar approach in its treatment of transportation networks. 
 Network access has been addressed by the Commission.  In 1998, it adopted a Notice on 
the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications 
sector, which clarifies its approach to Article 82 on these issues. Several principles used in the 
telecom sector on access should be applicable to other comparable network industries where 
there is dominance. 
 In sum, both jurisdictions have not shown any indication that network industries are so 
special as to require different treatment from other industries with essential facilities or that 
they need the application of a special set of rules in reviewing antitrust concerns in network 
industries. Nor is there any indication that these industries warrant special leniency or 
forbearance from enforcement. 
 
7.0 Concluding Remarks 
 
Networks are a strategic tool to gain competitive advantage. They are widespread in Canada 
providing everyday links from home to work and life lines to diverse regions together with 
corridors for our export and import trade. Our economic futures are more closely tied to the 
sustainability of our transportation networks than we might care to admit. Continuing to 
develop the system must become our priority simply to protect the standard of living. 
(Parsons, 2003, p. 27) 
 Unfortunately, the transportation network that supports the rapid transformation of our 
society has not been keeping pace. This has had a major impact creating special challenges. 
While some worthy projects have been initiated such as the Asia-Pacific Gateway, the 
expansion of certain cross-border corridors and the $1.4b spent on Ontario highways in 2006, 
others need to be addressed related to urban networks. 
 Part of the current problems that we face arises because we have been slow to adjust to 
domestic and international changes and because the pricing mechanism has not been used 
fully to achieve our objectives in part. Industries with networks have special features and 
expansion or agreements among competitive networks have a number of effects.  
  From the competition perspective, networks are not referred to in any provision of the 
Competition Act though anti-competitive practices in such industries raise concern in light of 
their structural characteristics. However, care should be exercised in drawing any conclusions. 
Both the US and the EEC antitrust authorities have not shown any indication that network 
industries are so special as to require different treatment from other industries with essential 
facilities or that they need the application of a special set of rules in reviewing antitrust 
concerns. 
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